


















Environment and Production Technology Division 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 












EPTD Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a full 
peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers 
will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised. 
 
 
MANAGING DROUGHTS IN THE LOW-RAINFALL AREAS OF 
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
 
 
Peter Hazell, Peter Oram, and Nabil Chaherli 
   i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Drought is a recurrent and often devastating threat to the welfare of countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where three-quarters of the arable land has 
less than 400 mm of annual rainfall, and the natural grazings, which support a majority of 
the 290 million ruminant livestock, have less than 200 mm.  Its impact has been 
exacerbated in the last half century by the human population increasing yearly at over 
3%, while livestock numbers have risen by 50% over the quinquennium. 
Virtually no scope exists for further expansion of rainfed farming and very little 
for irrigation, hence there is competition between mechanized cereal production and 
grazing in the low rainfall areas, and traditional nomadic systems of drought management 
through mobility are becoming difficult to maintain.  Moreover droughts seem to be 
increasing in frequency, and their high social, economic, and environmental costs have 
led governments to intervene with various forms of assistance to farmers and herders, 
including distribution of subsidized animal feed, rescheduling of loans, investments in 
water development, and in animal health. 
In this paper we examine the nature and significance of these measures, both with 
respect to their immediate benefits and costs to the recipients and to governments, and to 
their longer term impact on poverty and the environment.  We conclude that while they 
have been valuable in reducing catastrophic losses of livestock and thus alleviating 
poverty, especially in the low rainfall areas where they are the predominant source of 
income, continued dependence on these programs has sent inappropriate signals to 
farmers and herders, leading to moral hazards, unsustainable farming practices, and 
environmental degradation, while generally benefiting the affluent recipients most.    ii
Moreover, they have tended to escalate and become an administrative and financial 
burden to their governments. 
Alternative approaches to drought management need to be explored, and 
possibilities discussed here include area-based rainfall insurance against catastrophic 
droughts, and the development of more accurate timely, and accessible early warning 
drought forecasts.  While we envisage the insurance as an unsubsidized private sector 
initiative with a number of attractive features, it would require strong support from the 
government in its formative stages. Improved weather forecasts are likely to remain a 
government responsibility in the immediate future and would help administrators and 
relief agencies position themselves for more efficient drought interventions, as well as 
farmers to adjust their plans to rainfall outcomes. 
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1.  DROUGHT PROBLEMS FACING LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT IN THE MENA 
REGION 
Drought is not a phenomenon confined to dry areas of the world. In 1999, it caused 
unprecedented water shortages, bans on washing cars and watering lawns, and disputes over 
policy for water use between neighboring states in the Washington, D.C. area of the United 
States--certainly not an arid or even a semi-arid climatic region! However, in ecoregions where 
the prevailing rainfall regime is semi-arid and/or arid, and temperatures are high during a 
significant portion of the year, frequent visitations of drought compound the problems of 
resource management for agriculture, seriously threaten human and animal welfare, and 
jeopardize economic development. 
This is the case in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where a 
high proportion of the total land is located in ecozones which are classified in terms of 
precipitation as semi-arid, arid, or hyper-arid and where drought is no stranger. (Table 1).  
                                                 
1 In this context ‘livestock’ refers to ruminant animals (cattle, camels, sheep, and goats), but not pigs or poultry. 
2 This paper deals primarily with eight countries of the Mashreq and Maghreb regions of the Middle East and North 






Table 1--Classification of Mediterranean Bioclimatic Zones in Middle East by 
Precipitation 
Zone type  Annual rainfall (mm)  Percent of arable area 
Super-arid    < 200    0 
Semi-arid 1    200-400    74 
Semi-arid 2    400-600    14 
Sub-humid    600-800    10 
Humid    800-1200    1 
Super-humid    > 1200    1 
 
Drought has long been a significant factor in this region, particularly for the low-rainfall 
crop-livestock systems and for herders in the vast grazing areas of the steppe.  The problems 
were severe even in biblical times, but over the centuries, the total magnitude of the economic 
costs caused by droughts has increased, at least in proportion to the increases in human and 
livestock populations. 
Unfortunately, the level of wealth accumulated in these agro-pastoral societies is 
inadequate to provide full protection from severe droughts, and the economic and human losses 
in drought periods can be severe. The problem has worsened with population growth, as more 
and more people seek to earn a livelihood from the meager resources available in these areas.  It 
may also have been aggravated by more frequent and prolonged droughts associated with global 
warming. The high cost and the increasing vulnerability of agro-pastoral societies has led many 
governments in the region to intervene with various forms of drought assistance. 
However, many of these interventions are encouraging farming practices that could 
increase both the extent of future drought losses and the dependence of local people on 
government assistance.  They are also costly to governments, and use resources that could 





existing types of drought relief programs justify their costs, particularly when their long-term 
impacts on poverty and the environment are assessed. It is also important to know if drought 
relief programs can be designed better to achieve their immediate objectives, but without 
distorting economic incentives for more sustainable management of natural resources. This paper 
addresses these issues. 
 
2.  LAND AND WATER AVAILABILITY AND USE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 
Agricultural land in this region is extremely limited. Arable land and permanent crops 
comprise only about 7 percent of the total land area, 25 percent is classified as pasture – mainly 
in ecozones with under 200mm mean annual precipitation (m.a.p.), and 7 percent is forest and 
woodland (often in poor condition due to grazing and fuel gathering). About 61 percent is 
identified as ‘other’ and is unsuited to agricultural use. This is mostly desert but there is some 
extensive grazing (Food & Agricultural Organization [FAO] 1995).  The majority of the region 
has a Mediterranean climate with cool to cold winters and hot dry summers. Most of the rainfall 
is in the winter, but it is highly erratic in space and time, making agriculture a risky business. 
In the Middle East about three quarters of the arable area is in the semi-arid rainfall zone 
with 200-400 mm of m.a.p. and a growing season of 75-120 days: only 12 percent is defined as 
humid or sub-humid with over 600mm m.a.p. Below 400 mm, the scope for crop diversification 
on rainfed land is limited: farm surveys in several countries show a sharp decline in the share of 
legumes, oilseeds, and vegetables, and an increasing dominance of cereals—especially barley 
(grown mainly for animal feed) with decreasing rainfall down to 150 mm, where the area of 





Irrigation makes an important contribution to agricultural production, value added, and 
employment in most MENA countries, especially in the Middle East, where it represents almost 
30 percent of the cultivated area overall.  In North Africa (excluding Egypt where nearly all 
cropland is irrigated) it accounts for about 11 percent of the cultivated area. However, problems 
of soil and water pollution from agricultural uses and urban and industrial wastes, overpumping 
of ground water aquifers, salinization, and competition from other users are becoming major 
constraints, while the prospects for further significant expansion of the irrigated area are very 
limited. 
While cattle are predominant in irrigated areas, in Syria, for example, there is increasing 
seasonal migration of sheep flocks to those areas to access crop residues and by-products 
(ICARDA 1992). However, most of the 250 million head of small ruminants in MENA are based 
on farms and rangelands in the lowland semi-arid and arid zones under extensive systems of 
management.
3 There is also a considerable but less well-documented ruminant population in the 
higher altitude plateau, mountain regions and forest grazings of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, and 
Turkey. 
Livestock are both a principal component of agricultural incomes and the main source of 
family wealth in these low rainfall and upland areas. In most MENA countries they contribute 
around 30 percent of agricultural GDP.  Numbers of sheep have increased in the Middle East 
from 96 million in 1961-65 to about 135 million in the mid-1990’s and from 22 million to 49 
million over the same period in North Africa (Table 2). 
                                                 
3 ICARDA has documented seasonal migratory movements of  flocks to higher rainfall arable and irrigated land.  
These can cover distances of up to 100 km from their bases, and may involve some cash and kind payments to the 




Table 2--Livestock Population in the Middle East and North Africa 1961-65 to 1996-98
1 
Numbers of Stock – ‘000 head  Change in numbers 1961-65 = 100 
 
1961-65  1979-81  1989-91  1996-98    1979-89  1989-91  1996-98 
Sheep 
             
  Middle East    96,292    125,556    137,125   133,110    130.3    142.4    138.2 
  North Africa    21,791    39,727    45,174    49,121    182.3    207.3    225.4 
  WANA total   118,083    165,283    182,299   182,231    140.2    154.4    154.9 
Goats               
  Middle East    56,589    44,716    50,323    53,549    179.0    188.9    94.6 
  North Africa    10,825    12,334    16,279    18,283    116.7    150.4    168.9 
  WANA total    67,414    57,050    66,602    71,832    84.6    98.7    106.6 
Cattle               
  Middle East    25,041    27,338    24,749    25,679    109.2    98.8    102.5 
  North Africa    6,502    7,520    8,285    7,718    115.7    127.4    118.7 
  WANA total    31,543    34,858    33,034    33,397    110.5    104.7    105.9 
Camels               
  Middle East    1,413    954    1,279    1,391    67.5    90.5    98.4 
  North Africa    984    776    586    643    78.9    59.5    65.3 
  WANA total    2,397    1,730    1,865    2,034    72.2    77.8    84.8 
                     




Recent FAO data indicate some stabilization of small ruminant numbers in MENA since 
1989, Iran and Morocco being the exceptions. In Turkey the size of flocks has diminished due to 
erosion of grazings and reduced feed supplies (ICARDA 1991). The goat population has 
declined by about 3 million head to 53 million (5.4 percent) since 1961-65 in the Middle East, 
but their numbers have increased by 69 percent to 18 million in North Africa.  Camel numbers 
declined slightly to 1.4 million in the Middle East, but more sharply by 35 percent to 643,000 in 
North Africa.  This probably reflects their displacement by motor vehicles as a source of 
mobility for movements of stock and people, and also the decline of nomadic livestock systems 
either by choice or under duress from governments, as a consequence of nationalization of 
rangelands and settlement programs. (Blench 1998) 
Human population growth is high, currently around 3.3 percent per annum for the MENA 
region as a whole: the projected gap between domestic production and consumption of grain is 
75 million metric tonnes (mmt) in 2020, compared to about 33 mmt in 1990 (El Beltagy 1997).
4 
Another estimate indicates that a considerable proportion of that increased grain consumption 
would be related to an increase in ruminant livestock numbers paralleled by a significant decline 
in the contribution of pastures to their overall feed supply (Nordblom and Shomo 1995). 
While drought has long been a plague in the MENA countries, those countries are 
increasingly vulnerable to its ravages, due to the rising pressures of people and domestic animals 
on a dwindling land and water resource base. 
 
                                                 
4 This is probably a conservative estimate; it assumes zero growth of per capita incomes and of p.c. grain 




3.  THE IMPACT OF DROUGHTS IN THE REGION 
Given the erratic precipitation in the MENA region, there are many years when annual 
rainfall falls below normal. But drought, at least as perceived in this paper, is associated with 
catastrophic rainfall shortages. What is a critical rainfall outcome? Pratt, Le Gall and de Haan 
(1997) suggest that a drought can be said to occur in a year when rainfall falls below half the 
long-term average, or when rainfall in two or more successive years is below 75 percent of that 
average. Rainfall failure stunts pastures, desiccates water points, greatly reduces crop yield, and 
kills livestock. It can lead to the liquidation of a significant part of the total flock in the absence 
of other sources of feed. Moreover, since the main commercial output of pastoral systems is 
meat, meat prices tend to be negatively correlated with drought (more animals are available for 
sale in drought years), and while this benefits urban consumers, it accentuates income shortfalls 
of producers. As human populations grow, so do animal stocking rates — the number of animals 
kept on a given land area. Thus, pastures are put under increasing stress, which in turn increases 
their vulnerability to drought. What used to be a manageable rainfall outcome may now be 
considered a serious drought that leads to significant economic and social costs. 
Oram (1998) provides a review of some of the more recent consequences of drought for 
livestock production in the region.  In the 1945 Moroccan drought, 25 percent of the cattle and 
39 percent of the sheep either died or were sold prematurely on a glutted market (Iovanna 1996).  
In a major drought between 1958 and 1962, at least 70 percent of the then considerable camel 
herd in Jordan died, leading to the virtual demise of camels as an economic element of livestock 
production there.  More recently about 30 percent of the national sheep flock was lost or 
slaughtered prematurely in the 1997 drought there.  In Syria some 3 million sheep (about 25 




of feed. (Oram and de Haan 1995). Feed shortages for livestock are due not only to the effects of 
drought on the natural grazings, but also to their impact on cereal yields; in the 1995 Moroccan 
drought, cereal production fell to 1.8 mmt from 9.6 mmt in 1994 (El Mourid and Moussaoui 
1998). Yields of barley, the staple cereal of the low rainfall areas, have not improved greatly in 
several countries over the long term, and with the exception of the Lebanon--the least drought-




Table 3--Yield Trends of Barley in the Middle East and North Africa  (Kg/ha) 
  1961/65  1969/71  1979/81  1989/91  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1993/9 
North Africa 
                       
  Algeria  587    608    782    892    625    648    540    1404    721    745    753    776 
  Libya  248    326    356    497    500    497    493    729    675    714    714    715 
  Morocco  808    1093    785    1172    477    1440    385    1577    663    812    815    617 
  Tunisia  286    378    626    909    933    592    328    1186    516    1165    1079    828 
West Asia                         
  Iraq  925    190    838    759    675    614    720    788    663    708    574    697 
  Jordan  689    481    365    739    1165    561    588    857    860    851    75    708 
  Lebanon  968    859    1025    1705    1750    1667    1654    2526    2527    2534    2534    2170 




4.  HOW HERDERS TRADITIONALLY MANAGE DROUGHTS IN MENA 
Agro-pastoral societies have developed their own strategies for coping with drought.  
These include: 
•  Mobile or transhumant grazing practices that reduce risks of having insufficient forage in 
any one location. 
•  Reciprocal grazing arrangements with more distant communities for access to their 
resources in drought years. 
•  Adjustment of flock sizes and stocking rates as the rainy reason unfolds, to best match 
available grazing resources. 
•  Keeping extra animals that can be easily liquidated in a drought, either for food or cash. 
•  Investment in water availability — wells, cisterns, water harvesting. 
•  Diversification into crops and livestock (agropastoralism) especially in proximity to 
settlements, and storage of surplus grain, straw, and forage as a reserve in good rainfall 
years. 
•  Diversification among animal species (sheep, goats, cattle, camels, donkeys), and 
different breeds within species. Sheep and goats are most numerous on the low rainfall 
rangelands of MENA. Cattle are more commonly maintained on farms, or on grazings in 
higher rainfall areas.  
•  Income diversification into non-agricultural occupations, particularly seasonal migration 
for off-farm employment. 
 
Traditional risk management strategies have proven effective in managing drought and 
have enabled pastoral societies to survive harsh environments for many centuries. The interplay 




equilibrium with the inherent productivity of the pastures, avoiding the long-term degradation of 
grazing areas. Stocking rates would trend upwards between droughts as herders bred more 
animals, but then would fall when the next drought occurred, fluctuations in herd size closely 
followed rainfall patterns, and peak stocking rates rarely reached unsustainable levels. 
But despite their advantages, traditional drought management strategies can have 
associated opportunity costs. It is useful to think in terms of two types of such costs: those 
arising from inefficient use of resources within existing agro-pastoral systems, and opportunity 
costs arising from failure to exploit more productive agricultural development pathways. 
Examples of the first type of opportunity cost are as follows: by liquidating animals 
during droughts, herders may end up with too few animals in the immediate post drought period, 
and hence miss out on important short-term production opportunities. On the other hand, given a 
sufficient respite between droughts, herders may build up excessive flock sizes in order to have a 
liquid asset as a hedge against the next drought. This can lead to overgrazing and the degradation 
of pasture, with reduced productivity. Herders also prefer to keep traditional breeds that are more 
drought tolerant, but which might be less productive than exotics under more favorable 
management, and are often reluctant to use or invest in modern inputs (feed, veterinary 
treatments, etc.) that could increase average profitability but which might lead to loss of capital 
investment if rainfall is unfavorable. There is a dearth of quantitative information about these 
costs. 
The second type of opportunity costs are more speculative. If mobility and transhumant 
grazing practices remain the primary strategy for managing drought risk, then communities must 
retain large areas of land as common properties, and make reciprocal grazing arrangements with 




privatization of land, which in turn can impede investment in land improvements and the 
development of more intensive and settled farming systems in areas where rainfall, soils, and 
topography make settlement a rational goal. 
Without a shift to such intensification strategies, it is not clear how rural communities can 
or should continue to absorb increases in their populations (Boserup 1981; Pingali et al. 1987). 
One alternative is that common property grazing areas be managed more effectively by local 
communities, with collective investment in land improvements, as is the case in Turkey and parts 
of Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia (Oram and de Haan 1995).  But the absence of many successful 
examples suggests that such local management is extremely difficult to organize, manage and 
sustain, particularly in the context of rapid population growth, uncertain property rights, and the 
increasing commercialization of agriculture which make cropping increasingly attractive in the 
less drought-prone areas.  
The lack of quantitative information about the opportunity costs of traditional risk 
management strategies in agro-pastoral systems is an obstacle to the design of good drought 
management policies, because those costs should be justified on the basis of the increases in 
productivity and incomes that they generate. More research is needed to determine just how 
elastic the productivity of pastoral systems is to changes in risk management opportunities, and 
whether there exist important options for increasing production that could be exploited if drought 
risk could be better managed. Research on these and other issues affecting mainly the low 
rainfall areas has unfortunately been given relatively low priority by MENA governments 





5.  ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PUBLIC INTERVENTIONS FOR DROUGHT 
MANAGEMENT 
Why Intervene? 
If traditional drought management practices are constraining growth, then it is relevant to 
ask if there are more efficient ways to manage the problem. This is equivalent to asking if there 
are market failures that the government can correct. How might such market failures arise? We 
suggest two possibilities.  
First, the covariate nature of drought risk makes more efficient risk spreading difficult 
within pastoral societies. Everybody suffers when drought occurs, and local sources of credit dry 
up just at a time when they are most needed. Also, livestock prices plummet during droughts 
when everybody is trying to sell (destock), and then rise rapidly afterwards when everybody is 
trying to buy to rebuild their flocks (restock). Credit and insurance markets for diffusing this 
covariate risk are weak in the rural areas of the MENA region. These problems, and the poor 
transportation and market infrastructure for livestock products in the pastoral regions are major 
obstacles to implementation of more orderly destocking and restocking of rangelands, as a 
solution to managing drought and preventing resource degradation (Behnke and Scoones 1993). 
Reviewing IFAD’s project experiences in pastoral systems of Africa, Sidahmed (1993) 
concludes that the destocking/restocking approach requires high investment (building market 
infrastructure, rural financial services, technical support and education), which is only possible in 
favorable ecological and climatic environments. 
A recent evaluation of destocking issues (Heffernan and Rushton 1998), shows that 
although it can assist successful rehabilitation of destitute pastoralists, many aspects of 
restocking are controversial, and the benefits are not easily quantified. Thus they suggest that 




supplementary feed and credit for repurchase of stock, for example. Hence, restocking becomes a 
component of a comprehensive development program rather than a panacea for pastoral 
rehabilitation. Decision support tools are needed to assess the environmental, economic, and 
cultural effects of restocking.  
Second, property rights problems over the ownership of crop and rangeland may prevent 
the spread of management practices and investments that lead to more efficient drought 
management strategies. Without adequate property rights, population growth can lead to 
excessive stocking rates, and to encroachment of cultivation into traditional rangeland areas.
5 
These changes in turn can induce degradation of range vegetation and soils, and by restricting the 
spatial mobility of flocks, increase herders’ exposure to drought risk. However, the inability to 
protect sown pastures, community managed grazings, private shrub plantations, and forests from 
wandering flocks, shows that unrestricted grazing can also be damaging.  
These kinds of market failures can provide a rationale for public intervention. However, 
governments might also be motivated to intervene with drought management policies for other 
social and environmental reasons. These include: 
 
￿ Government has an obligation to alleviate human misery in drought years and to help 
protect the stock of breeding animals for the future. Drought relief measures may be 
seen as cheaper than safety net programs. 
￿ Herders and farmers may default on loans in drought years, causing difficult 
problems for lending institutions. 
                                                 
5 Recent experience indicates that some barley planting on rangelands is done by or with the knowledge and consent 
of the herders, specifically to provide feed, which could be grain, straw, and stubble in a good year, and biomass in 




￿ Overgrazing of pastures that are already drought stressed, and soil compaction in 
areas around water holes, may contribute to wind erosion and local climate change 
that have negative externality costs for a country. Falling water tables can also have 
far reaching effects within a country.   
Principles of Intervention 
While humanitarian objectives are often the initial reason for government and donor 
drought relief interventions, they can prove economically expensive in the long term. This is 
particularly true if they are not designed to overcome more fundamental problems — such as 
market failure — which prevent more efficient and productive use of resources in agro-pastoral 
systems. Moreover, simply being able to fix an underlying problem is not sufficient to ensure 
that it is economically worthwhile. It also needs to be shown that the problem can be fixed at a 
cost that is less than the benefits, and in ways that give a reasonable rate of   return on public 
funds. Both the short- and longer-term implications of alternative approaches to drought 
management must be examined, since ad hoc approaches have caused awkward problems for 
governments. 
Where drought relief is required as a result of market failures (e.g., inappropriate property 
rights systems, or a poorly developed financial market), it may be more cost effective to fix the 
underlying problem (e.g., reform property rights, strengthen rural financial markets) rather than 
to incur the repeated costs of drought relief. Similarly, public investment opportunities to reduce 
drought losses (e.g., water catchment areas and wells) may also be more cost effective over time 
than drought relief. Unfortunately, these kinds of opportunities are typically quite limited in 
many drought-prone areas, and there may be little alternative in the near-term to public drought 




The cost of public drought management interventions is relatively easy to determine, but 
the benefits are much harder to assess. One-time interventions can provide significant 
humanitarian relief. But once drought management policies become institutionalized so that 
farmers and herders begin to take them for granted, they can lead to important changes in 
farming practices which impact on productivity. Well-designed and implemented drought 
management policies can contribute to greater productivity, and thereby justify their costs. But 
poorly designed interventions may lead to small productivity gains, or may even be 
counterproductive. 
Any good risk management aid should enable farmers and herders to take greater risks in 
their quest for higher average returns. If farmers are risk averse, then they trade off some level of 
expected income for lower risk (e.g., through diversification strategies). The amount of expected 
income foregone to reduce risk can be viewed as a risk premium paid, or a production cost 
(Sandmo 1971; Robison and Barry 1987). If this cost can be reduced by the introduction of an 
improved risk management aid, then the farmer may be able to change strategy (e.g., specialize 
more in the most profitable activities) and obtain a higher average income for the same amount 
of risk.  This change not only improves expected farm incomes, but can also lead to spillover 
benefits to consumers at an aggregate level through lower prices as the supply function shifts 
downwards by the amount of the reduction in the risk premium per unit of output. This effect is 
very similar to the effect of a new cost-reducing technology, and providing the new risk 
management aid is not subsidized, then there is always a net gain in social welfare. But if the 
new risk management aid is subsidized, then the effect is similar to a subsidy on any other farm 




the dead weight loss of the subsidy is always greater than sum of the additional producer and 
consumer welfare that it generates (Siamwalla and Valdes 1986).  
What does this mean in practice? That subsidized drought management interventions can 
reduce risk costs to farmers to below their true social value, leading to excessive risk taking and 
increased exposure to future drought losses. Not only is there a built in dependence on future 
drought assistance from the government, but also the net social return to that assistance can be 
small or even negative. The bottom line is that wherever possible, public interventions should be 
limited to drought management interventions that farmers pay for themselves, although it might 
be necessary for governments to devise arrangements which allow deferred payment in 
installments. 
Another potential problem with poorly designed drought management policies is that 
they can lead to moral hazards. This is a well-known problem in the insurance literature, and 
refers to the incentive problems that arise when an insurer underwrites risks whose outcomes can 
be influenced by the insured’s behavior. For example, if an insurance company contracts to 
compensate a farmer for yield losses against pest and disease damage, then the farmer will have 
reduced incentive to be diligent in protecting or treating his/her crop once he/she realizes that the 
insurance will compensate for losses anyway. Moral hazards lead to greater losses than 
necessary, it increases the risk exposure of the insurer, and it makes actuarial calculations of 
those risks almost impossible. Similar problems can arise if a government indiscriminately 
compensates for drought losses that could have been reduced or avoided by herders. Unless 
appropriately targeted, feed subsidy programs could, for example, lead to reduced incentive to 
exploit remaining grazing opportunities, particularly in more remote areas that require greater 




problems. Once farmers’ know that their debt will be forgiven, then they have increased 
incentive to borrow more than is prudent, and reduced incentive to minimize their costs during 
droughts. Such behavior leads to greater losses than necessary, and makes feed subsidies and 
credit programs more expensive than they need to be. 
 
6.  PAST EXPERIENCE WITH DROUGHT INTERVENTION POLICIES IN MENA 
Governments throughout the MENA region have intervened to help manage drought 
losses, but usually on the basis of crisis relief once the drought has set in (e.g., distribution of 
subsidized feeds for livestock, well drilling, and debt forgiveness). Since the primary motive is 
typically humanitarian assistance, not much thought may be given to the longer-term impacts of 
drought interventions on farming practices and productivity.  
The result is often an inappropriate set of economic signals to farmers and herders, 
leading to unsustainable farming practices in drought prone areas that increase both future 
drought losses and farmers’ dependence on government assistance, and to moral hazard 
problems that further add to the government’s cost of providing drought compensation. A good 
analogy is the experience with hurricane disaster assistance in the USA. By routinely stepping in 
to compensate homeowners for their losses after a hurricane, the government encourages home 
construction in vulnerable coastal areas where prudent investors would not otherwise build, and 
encourages fraudulent practices within the home repair and construction industry. These 
problems add enormously to the cost of government assistance over time. Since this paper is 
concerned with drought management policies as an aid to more efficient risk management in 




productivity. We turn now to look at two of the most common drought management policies 
used in the MENA region. 
Feed subsidies 
To reduce drought losses for farmers and herders, governments throughout the region 
have introduced extensive drought management policies during recent decades. These 
interventions have focused on providing supplementary feeds to safeguard livestock, with the 
predominant expenditure going for subsidies towards the costs and distribution (usually by 
parastatals) of concentrates and other feeds, especially barley, as well as investments in water 
development, and animal disease prevention. Feed imports are also relaxed in drought years, 
while imports of livestock and livestock products are constrained to maintain domestic prices, 
and cross-border movements of animals and meat exports may be prohibited. 
These programs have been quite successful in protecting livestock numbers and 
production during droughts. Although the 1995 Moroccan drought was devastating, with total 
cereal production falling to only 17 percent of that in 1994, the ruminant livestock sector was 
only slightly affected (Laamari and El Mourid 1998; Oram 1997).  Boughanmi (1996) states that 
because of drought relief measures, sheep numbers in Tunisia rose consistently during the 
droughts of the early 1990s, while the World Bank estimates that in the absence of such relief 
measures, producer prices would have dropped by approximately 40 percent during the 1988-89 
drought. According to the World Bank, potential losses to producers during 1988 and 1989 could 
have been 119.7 million dinars (US$ 133 million), or 11.3 percent of agricultural value added but 
this was prevented by a program that cost 74 million dinars ($82 million), or 6.9 percent of 
agricultural value added. By preventing the large-scale loss of livestock, the interventions also 
eliminated potential livestock production losses in subsequent years, but these are not included in 




severe on crops than livestock, especially in North Africa, although this compounds the feed 
supply problems for livestock.  
Although they have helped limit production losses caused by drought, the drought 
management programs have also had negative impacts. These include the following: 
They have probably accelerated rangeland degradation in the long term by undermining 
the traditional process of adjusting flock size to inter-annual climatic variations. Herd sizes have 
increased sharply in recent years, and grazing practices have changed so that many of the 
animals no longer leave the rangeland areas during the dry season but have their feed and water 
trucked in. This practice leads to overgrazing during the dry season, reduces the natural seeding 
of annual pasture species, disturbs the soil, and contributes to wind erosion, particularly in areas 
near water and feed supply points. User fees have been suggested as an economic signal of the 
scarcity and value of the rangelands (Kassas et al. 1991); whether this approach would be a 
viable option in these large and often remote areas remains to be tested. 
High government procurement prices for barley have encouraged the mechanized 
encroachment of barley cultivation on to rangeland areas where it cannot be sustained. An 
additional motive in some countries is that cultivation allows its perpetrators to claim user rights 
to the land. The Syrian government, for example, has banned barley production in zones where 
annual rainfall is under 250 mm (Cooper and Bailey 1990). 
Feed subsidies have added to the fiscal burden on governments. During the 1994 drought, 
for example, some 500,000 tons of heavily subsidized concentrate were fed to livestock under 
the program in Tunisia. In Morocco, it is estimated that 420,000 tons of feed were distributed 




Mourid 1998) (0.8 percent of agricultural value added). The same program cost the government 
about $28 million during the 1995 drought. 
In Jordan, cumulative feed subsidy costs between 1991-96 were 168.4 million JD 
(US$116 million), and $55 million of this was incurred in the 1996-97 drought alone, 
representing about 26% of agricultural value added. (Salem 1998). The program created 
numerous distortions, including poor farm efficiency, little attention to fodder crop production or 
to care for conservation of range resources. The latter was due partly to the increased numbers of 
animals made possible by the subsidized feed, partly to incentives to mechanized cultivation of 
rangelands and partly to ambiguous property rights. Although the subsidies contained an element 
of welfare, the 15 percent of the flock owners who possessed 62 percent of the national flock 
were the main benefactors. 
Subsidies tend to become permanent and they have proved difficult to target, with the 
lion’s share of the subsidized concentrates going to large herders and to commercial farms. 
Indeed, during the Moroccan drought of 1992, many farmers claimed that they received only 
small amounts of subsidized feed (about 1 percent of total feed needs) (Laamari and El Mourid 
1998). 
In spite of these problems several MENA countries have moved to permanent feed 
subsidy systems, expending considerable public resources on the distribution of heavily 
subsidized concentrates every year (Pratt et al. 1997).  
However even well-planned measures can misfire with far-reaching ramifications, as was 
the case with the livestock development project in Syria, implemented with World Bank support 
in 1978, which resembles in several ways the campaigns in Jordan and North Africa.  This 




•  the improvement of feed availability;  
•  the provision of special credits for livestock development, and for supplementary feed at 
subsidized prices; 
•  the improvement of veterinary services, and the control of major animal health problems, 
especially sheep pox and parasites; and,  
•  support to various types of cooperatives for animal breeding, fattening, and range 
improvement. 
In the short run this project was technically very successful, with numbers of sheep 
increasing from 5.8 million in 1975 to 13.4 million in 1983, an average annual rate of growth of 
about 10 percent. Eradication of sheep pox—a major case of loss, was an outstanding 
achievement. However, in the long term the failure to establish the feed reserve foreseen in the 
plan to support the expanded national flock proved to be its Achilles heel. (Oram and de Haan 
1995). 
Drought struck in 1983 and 1985, with devastating effect, and although Syria had a 
barley surplus of 555,627 metric tons in 1982 the government was forced to import 299,314 
metric tons of feed in 1984 despite a shortage of foreign exchange.   This had serious 
repercussions on the fast-growing private sector poultry industry which received lower priority 
for feed than state and cooperative enterprises, driving up costs of poultry production at a time 
when the meat market was glutted with sheep meat as a result of drought-induced slaughtering. 
The national sheep flock declined by 2.5 million (almost 20 percent from 1983 to 1985). 
Demand for poultry meat fell below cost, and because storage was inadequate, a number of 




Capital accumulation by flock owners as a result of credit and cheap feed fueled the rapid 
and ultimately disastrous build-up of sheep numbers during this period.  A contributory factor 
was increased grazing pressure on the rangelands whose estimated contribution to total feed 
supply declined from 65 percent to 33 percent, due partly to plowing of previously uncultivated 
land for barley production, as well as to the increasing number of animals during the course of 
the project. Concurrently concentrate feed rose from 6 percent to 26 percent of total feed 
consumption, with local cooperatives as a main instrument of government for their distribution 
and sale; while the contribution of crop residues to feed supply increased from 25 to 30 percent. 
Experience in Syria shows that judging the success of feed subsidies and other measures 
to alleviate droughts in low rainfall areas requires a long time horizon. Syria has made 
considerable progress since the 1980’s, but still faces the challenge of a new two-to-three year 
drought. 
The high budgetary costs and negative environmental impacts of subsidies have led some 
countries to reconsider their drought management programs. Jordan recently abolished its feed 
subsidy program as part of its structural adjustment program, and this has led to a very sizeable 
reduction in the national flock of sheep and goats (perhaps by as much as 30 percent in two 
years).
6 Syria, on the other hand, maintains its feed subsidy program, but has now banned the 
cultivation of barley in many of the steppe areas. This is a controversial decision because it 
appears that much of the barley planted there was used by local herders for grazing green as well 
as for grain and straw. Even if grain production in drought years was negligible, stubble and 
straw could still have been used for grazing. 
                                                 
6 However, this has also led to livestock owners using the rangelands for longer periods, raising concerns about 




Credit support and drought 
Systematic rescheduling of credit for farmers during drought years has also been an 
important policy approach to drought management. However, while providing some short-term 
relief to herders and small farmers, this approach has proved of greatest benefit to larger farms, 
and has contributed to the chronically poor debt collection performance of the region’s 
agricultural development banks. 
In Tunisia, for example, debt was rescheduled during the 1994/95 drought at a cost to the 
government of 30.8 million dinars (US$30 million), 1.5 percent of agricultural value added. The 
loss was due primarily to lost interest payments (Zekri et al. 1997). The program benefited a 
mere 2850 farmers, and because of the nature of transaction costs involved in the process and the 
initial collateral required by the banks, the main beneficiaries were large rather than small farms. 
Moreover, credit rescheduling favored farmers in the higher potential zones with cattle 
operations rather than sheep owners who tend to have a more extensive production system 
primarily based in the lower rainfall zones (e.g. in the Center and southern regions of Tunisia). 
This support for the more intensive cattle operations is reflected by the relatively steady increase 
in milk production in Tunisia in the period from 1987 to 1995 despite the incidence of two 
drought years (Boughanmi 1996). 
In Syria, Shibani (1997) reports the same type of impact from credit rescheduling in 
drought years.  The Feed Fund provides credit for farmer associations and cooperatives at 
subsidized rates (5.5% for 8 months) and covers up to 80% of the total value of feed to be 
purchased. On average over four agricultural campaigns (1986 to 1989), 150 farmer cooperatives 
benefited from subsidized feed credits. The credits distributed to these associations over these 
four campaigns totaled 588 M SL (US$14 million).  However, the program was shut down after 




to the Higher Agricultural Council.  The latter has agreed to cover the continuing operation of 
this fund from the Agricultural Bank’s budget. In Syria livestock associations have been the 
main beneficiaries of credit rescheduling and subsidized credit for feed purchases. As in Tunisia 
and Morocco, this raises equity considerations with respect to the impact of public drought relief 
operations on the smaller flock owners who are often not organized within an association. 
 
7.  NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVED DROUGHT MANAGEMENT 
A limitation of most drought management interventions is that they inadvertently 
subsidize inappropriate farming practices and encourage moral hazard problems. They also 
represent a recurring fiscal burden to governments, which can become institutionalized, and are 
hard to sustain over the years. Two newly emerging approaches can avoid these problems by 
providing farmers and herders with the means to better manage drought risks themselves with a 
minimum of government intervention. 
Rainfall Insurance 
Agricultural insurance has often appealed to policy makers as an instrument of choice for 
helping farmers and agricultural banks manage climate risks like drought, and indeed many 
billions of dollars of public money are spent each year on agricultural insurance around the 
world. But the experience has generally not been favorable (Hazell et al. 1986). Publicly 
provided crop insurance has without exception depended on massive subsidies from government, 
and even then its performance has been plagued by the moral hazard problems associated with 
many sources of yield loss, by high administration costs, by political interference (especially of 
compensation payments in election years!), and by the difficulties of maintaining the managerial 




Livestock insurance that compensates for loss of animals or reduced productivity because of 
drought has rarely been offered, and seemingly not at all for herders in traditional pastoral 
systems. There are good reasons for this: the incidence of drought losses is usually too high to 
make the insurance affordable, opportunities for fraud and moral hazard are too great, and there 
is little opportunity for on-farm inspection of management practices or loss assessments, 
particularly when the animals are on the move.  
But given the frequent occurrence of drought and the widespread damage that it causes, 
there clearly is a need for some form of insurance against drought losses. Indeed, if such 
insurance could be successfully designed, it might well displace the need for public drought 
management policies. 
What is needed is a form of insurance that is affordable; accessible to all kinds of people; 
compensates for total income losses; is practical to implement given the limited kinds of data 
available; and can be provided by the private sector without the need for government subsidies. 
Area-based rainfall insurance offers a promising new alternative that in principle can 
meet all the requirements listed above (Skees et al. 1999). In this approach, rainfall insurance 
contracts are written against specific rainfall outcomes (e.g. drought or flood) at a local weather 
station. The rainfall events should be defined at catastrophic levels, and they should be highly 
correlated with the value of regional agricultural production or income. For example, an insured 
event might be that rainfall during the most critical month of the growing season falls 70 percent 
below normal. In years when the insured event occurs, all the people who purchased the 
insurance would receive the same payment per unit of insurance. In all other years, no payments 




Insurance is sold in standard units (e.g. $10 or $100), with a standard contract for each 
unit purchased called a Standard Unit Contract (SUC). Purchasers decide how many SUCs to 
buy. The insurance is sold on a full-cost basis, and the price of the SUC is the premium. The 
insurance must be sold before season-specific information about the insured risk becomes 
available. This requires a purchasing deadline (such as a month before the normal arrival of the 
rainy season), after which new SUCs are not sold. 
Area-based rainfall insurance has a number of attractive features: 
•  It avoids the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that plague crop insurance 
programs; 
•  it could be very inexpensive to administer; 
•  it uses only rainfall data, which is now available in most countries for long periods of 
time; 
•  the insurance can be sold to anyone, including agricultural traders and processors, farm 
input suppliers, banks, shopkeepers, and agricultural workers. There is no need to be a 
farmer, or to keep livestock; 
•  it would be easy for the private sector to run; 
•  as long as the insurance is voluntary and unsubsidized, it will only be purchased when it 
is a less expensive or more effective alternative to existing risk management strategies. 
•  a secondary market for insurance certificates could emerge which would enable people to 
cash in the tradable value of a SUC at any time. 
In designing an area-based rainfall insurance scheme, a number of difficulties need to be 




•  The insurer faces high risk because of the covariate nature of the insured risk.  When a 
payment is due, then all those who have purchased insurance against the same weather 
station must be paid at the same time. Moreover, if the insured risks at different rainfall 
stations are highly correlated, then the insurer faces the possibility of having to make 
huge payments in the same year. To hedge against this risk, the insurer can either 
diversify regionally by selecting weather stations and risks that are not highly (positively) 
correlated, or seek reinsurance in the international financial markets.  
•  Rainfall stations must be protected to prevent possible tampering of rainfall 
measurements. Possible approaches include a) more secure, tamper proof stations and 
instruments, b) triangulation of readings from  neighboring weather stations, and c) 
verification of low soil moisture by remote satellite sensing. 
•  The actuarial soundness of the insurance could be undermined by El Nino weather cycles 
that change the probability of the insured events.  It may be necessary to adjust the cost of 
the insurance whenever an El Nino event is confirmed. 
•  The volume of insurance sold could be too small to be profitable.  The insurance will 
only appeal to people whose economic losses are highly correlated with the insured 
rainfall event. If the basis risk (the uninsured part of a person’s risk) is high, then the 
insurance will not sell.  Also, if the probability of the insured risk is high, then the cost of 
the insurance could be prohibitive. To overcome these problems, the insurance should be 
limited to truly catastrophic droughts that significantly affect agricultural production in a 
region. 
The private sector might be expected to take the initiative in developing rainfall 




activity in developing countries. These include paying the research costs of identifying key 
catastrophic rainfall events that correlate strongly with agricultural production and income; 
educating rural people about the value of rainfall insurance; ensuring secure rainfall stations; 
establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for rainfall insurance; and 
underwriting the insurance in some way (perhaps through contingent loans) until a sufficient 
volume of business has been established that international reinsurers or banks are willing to 
come in and assume the underwriting role. These roles need not be costly, but could prove 
crucial in launching rainfall insurance. But it is also important not to launch the insurance on a 
subsidized basis, so as not to distort incentives for private insurers or farmers and herders. 
Drought insurance of the kind proposed here is being seriously considered in Morocco and 
Tunisia, with the active interest of private international insurers. 
 
Early Warning Drought Forecasts 
In principle, the ability to provide early warning drought forecasts could be a powerful 
tool for avoiding many of the economic costs associated with the misallocation of resources that 
arise because farmers, herders and other decision makers have to commit resources each year 
before key rainfall outcomes are known. For example, decisions about planting crops (date of 
planting, seeding rate, initial fertilizer treatment, etc) often have to be made at the beginning of 
the wet season before knowledge about rainfall outcomes is available. The economic value of 
season specific forecasts really depends on the degree to which farmers can adjust their plans as 
the season’s rainfall unfolds. Of course, the reliability of the forecasts and the ability of the 
farmers to adjust their initial decisions in response to this information is also critical. If decisions 
about planting and cultivation practices, and the feeding, culling and seasonal movement of 




available, then forecast information will be less valuable. But if most decisions have to be made 
up front each season, then the scope for mistakes will be much larger and the potential economic 
gains from reliable forecast information will be greater. Stewart (1991) examines how the date of 
onset of the rainy season can provide a pretty reliable forecast of the ensuing seasonal rainfall 
pattern for Niamey, Niger, and shows how this information could be used to more optimally 
adjust planting and input decisions for the season (his “response” farming approach). Barbier and 
Hazell (1998) use a stochastic programming model to show how many of the decisions in a 
typical agro-pastoral community in Niger can be optimally adjusted to rainfall outcomes. 
Reliable drought forecasts could also enable governments and relief agencies to position 
themselves each year for more effective and cost efficient drought interventions. This possibility 
has already been realized, and there are now several early warning drought systems already in 
place in Africa, which have proved successful in giving advance notice of emerging drought 
situations. But these programs are really monitoring systems that track emerging rainfall patterns 
within a season rather than true weather forecasting systems that predict rainfall outcomes before 
they even begin. 
Reliable multi-year rainfall forecasts are not yet possible, but seasonal (from 3 to 6 
months out) forecasts have become more reliable, particularly where an important part of the 
year to year variation in seasonal rainfall can be attributed to the Pacific El Nino Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) weather patterns. As the ability to model these phenomena at the global and 
regional levels improves, it seems plausible to expect that more reliable seasonal forecasts will 
be available at local levels (Gibberd et al. 1995). This may prove to be one of the most exciting 
developments for drought management in the next few years. It seems likely that private weather 




also an area where government could play a catalytic role, and even subsidize many of the 
development costs without having to worry that this would distort resource management 
incentives at the farm level. 
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The need to improve methods for managing drought risks in the low-rainfall areas of 
MENA has increased in recent decades as population growth and climate change have 
contributed to greater demands on the resource base and accentuated both the incidence and 
severity of drought losses. Government interventions have typically been initiated on an ad hoc 
basis in response to crisis situations, and little thought is usually given to their long term impacts 
on the way farmers and herders manage resources and the productivity of agro-pastoral systems. 
There is now accumulating evidence to show that once drought management interventions are 
institutionalized, they lead to changes in the way resources are managed, including the increased 
cropping and privatization of rangeland resources, and to more settled patterns of livestock 
production. These changes can contribute to greater productivity and improved livelihoods. 
However, if drought management interventions are subsidized, they can also lead to the adoption 
of excessively risky farm management practices, with increased losses in drought years and a 
growing dependence on government assistance. Many drought management programs also 
contribute to moral hazard problems because they reduce incentives for prudent management by 
farmers and herders. Drought management interventions need to be designed so that they assist 
farmers and herders to better manage risk and to improve their productivity and incomes, but 
without distorting incentives in inappropriate ways. The experience with feed subsidy and credit 




incomes and food security in drought years, they have had negative impacts on the way resources 
are managed. Better alternatives could be area-based rainfall insurance, particularly if offered by 
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